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The European Banking Union  ill it be sufficient to avert 
another debt crisis in Europe  
 




The European Banking Union “EBU”  came into existence to help address crucial problems caused 
by the global financial crisis “GFC”  and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis “SDC” . In order 
to reinstate stability and credibility back into the European banking system, a stronger and more 
centralized set of criteria was required, to avert another debt crisis in Europe. Whether the EBU is 
sufficient, however, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, The EBU is a significant step towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union “EMU” . It enables the application of consistent banking rules, with 
new tools and procedures designed to result in a more unified, transparent and safer marketplace for 
banks. The EBU currently has two functioning pillars consisting of the SSM and SRM respectively. A 
third pillar, although not yet operational, is in the pipeline in the form of the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme “EDIS” . These pillars are underpinned by the Single Rulebook “SR” , which 
provides administrative and legal standards to ensure the efficient distribution of supervision, 
regulation and governance procedures. 
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The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union “EBU” , what its objectives are and the 
main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This essay means to critically 
discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
“SSM”  and the Single Resolution Mechanism “SRM” , the main pillars underpinning the structure, are 
robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. 
 
At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook “SR” , which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and 
nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and 
contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the 
past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states.  
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2.0 EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 
 
2.1 A EUROPEAN BANKING UNION PRIMER 
 
The EBU came into existence to help address crucial problems caused by the global financial crisis 
“GFC”  and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis “SDC” . In order to reinstate stability and 
credibility back into the European banking system, a stronger and more centralised set of criteria was 
required.  It was seen as a formula which would bring balance into the financial sector2. Vitor Constancio 
has described the EBU as “a transfer to the European level of the regulatory and institutional framework, 
responsible for safeguarding the robustness and stability of the banking sector”3. The EBU is a significant 
step towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union “EMU”  4 . It enables the application of 
consistent banking rules, with new tools and procedures designed to result in a more unified 5 , 
transparent6 and safer7 marketplace for banks8.  
 
The EBU currently has two functioning pillars consisting of the SSM and SRM respectively. A third pillar, 
although not yet operational, is in the pipeline in the form of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
“EDIS” 9. These pillars are underpinned by the Single Rulebook “SR” , which provides administrative 
and legal standards to ensure the efficient distribution of supervision, regulation and governance 
procedures10. The SR also includes rules on resolution and recovery procedures, a harmonised framework 
for the EDIS when it comes into play in 2017, and rules on capital requirements. The EBU ensures the 
consistent application of these rules across participating member states11. 
 
2.2 RATIONALE FOR THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 
 
“The double whammy of the international financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis”12 is pivotal in 
having led to the creation of the EBU. These inter-related events highlighted the major deformities and 
shaky foundations on which Europe’s financial framework rested. To prevent the European financial 
structure from collapsing13, it was necessary to revisit the existing financial architecture in order to 
improve it with underpinning structures of economic growth and financial stability14. The crises identified 
major structural problems and had “shaken to its foundations the banking system of the Eurozone”15. 
 
                                                        
2 E Ferran, “European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work”  page , available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426247. 
The legal basis for an EBU comes from Articles 114 and 127 (6) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.  
3  V Constancio, “Towards a European Banking Union” th September 2012), available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120907.en.html.  
4  European Central Bank, Banking Supervision, “Banking Union” , available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/bankingunion/html/index.en.html. 
5  By treating national and cross-border banking activities equally and by de-linking the financial health of banks from the 
countries in which they are located.  
6 By consistently applying common rules and administrative standards for supervision, recovery and resolution of banks. 
7 By intervening early if banks face problems in order to help prevent them from failing, and, if necessary, by resolving banks 
efficiently.  
8 European Central Bank (n 3).  
9 This is the last pillar of the EBU and is currently still in the consultation phase. It will only briefly be covered in this essay. 
However, it is also worth noting that a fourth pillar may be included in the future  the so-called Capital Markets Union. This was 
discussed by Clifford Chance Partner, Simon Gleeson, in a guest lecture on 3rd March 2013 at the University of Edinburgh. This 
will not be discussed further. 
10 European Central Bank (n 3). 
11 Ibid.  
12 D Howarth and L Quaglia, “The Steep Road to European Banking Union: Constructing the Single Resolution Mechanism”  
52 JCMS 125 at 125. 
13 E Avgouleas and D W Arner, “The Eurozone Debt Crisis and The European Banking Union: A Cautionary Tale of Failure and 
Reform”  page 18, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347937.  
14 Avgouleas and Arner (n 12) at 16. 
15 Avgouleas and Arner (n 12) at 18. 
 





A serious design flaw in Europe’s financial architecture was due to the absence of resolution and 
supervision mechanisms16. This had led to a previously flawed supervisory model, which proved to be 
crucial in justifying the sceptics who doubted whether the so-called financial trilemma of a stable financial 
system, national financial policies and financial integration, were simultaneously compatible17.   
 
The failure of financial institutions operating both globally and cross-border within Europe, was due to 
weak structural laws in co-ordination and co-operation and given the inter-connectedness of financial 
institutions, it soon became a systemically important issue18. These failed financial institutions revealed 
the level of distrust that was apparent amongst national supervisors19. As a result, when it came to 
dealing with cross border issues, such as in the Icelandic banks and Fortis case, rather than following a 
supra-national approach, regulators followed a national one 20 . Consequently, three main problems 
became apparent: 
1. The macro-prudential oversight framework in the EU, which monitors systemic risk, was non-
existent; 
2. The collapse of Icelandic banks exposed a failure in “home country control” 21;  
3. The Fortis case highlighted issues in the cross-border framework in relation to bank resolution 
and crisis management22.  
 
Political factors also compromised the “credibility of rule-based frameworks for co-ordination of national 
fiscal policies in the Euro area”23. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact “SGP”  was intended to 
protect public finances and prevent Eurozone members, by enforcing budgetary discipline, from 
embracing fiscal policies, leading to unmanageable debt levels24. However, lenient enforcement of the 
SGP, due to a loophole in the Maastricht Treaty, led to the SGP becoming a political bargaining chip in 
the EU, at the expense of important economic issues25. 
As a res l , E ropean financial s abili  as hampered. Colossal pre-crisis and private debt piles, a 
flawed macro economic framework and an absence of institutions capable of handling effectively 
a cross border banking crisis had simply been ignored for far too long 26  The incomple e 
institutional design was the true mark of an imbalanced and disjointed monetary union, also 
characterized by the absence of effective fiscal convergence mechanisms to enforce budget 
discipline 27.  
 
In the midst of crisis, members of the Eurozone fought the crisis and supported bailout mechanisms, 
which led to the formation of the so-called European Financial Stability Facility “EFSF” 28 . 
Simultaneously, the EBU, based on structures safeguarding centralisation of bank supervision, deposits 
insurance arrangements and a central crisis resolution mechanism29  was founded.  
 
The noticeable impact to the Eurozone caused by “economic and financial imbalances” with the Union 
itself lacking a “central fiscal authority” that, had one existed, would have been a valuable weapon and 
a “credible mechanism to enforce budget” discipline30.  
 
                                                        
16 E Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, The Economics, The Politics (2012) 263-265. 
17 D Schoenmaker, “The financial trilemma”   Economic Letters 57 at 57.  See also, Avgouleas, Governance (n 15) 263-265. 
18 Avgouleas, Governance (n 15) 263-265.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Avgouleas, Governance (n 15) 264.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Avgouleas and Arner (n 12) at 18.  
24 Ibid.   
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Avgouleas and Arner (n 12) at 17.  
28 This has been superseded by the so-called “European Stability Mechanism”. 
29 Avgouleas and Arner (n 12) at 17. 
30 Ibid.  
 





2.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 
 
The EBU, as an essential component of the EMU and internal market, ensures that banks abide by a 
harmonised set of rules regarding resolution and supervision31. These rules are specifically designed to 
ensure that banks do not take unnecessary risks, with the erring bank paying for its mistakes with the 
possibility of closure, whilst minimising taxpayer costs32. Adherence to the rules is crucial in order to avert 
another crisis. It is important in this regard to ensure that banks are robust, there is minimal market 
fragmentation and financial stability is secure 33 .  Light-touch supervision and self-regulation are 
ineffective in the financial sector34.   
 
2.3.1 PROTECT EU TAXPAYERS  MONEY 
 
The 2008 GFC encountered enormous bank bailout packages, like that of Fortis35 and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland36, who were funded by the taxpayer to safeguard against failure. A main objective of the EBU 
is to protect EU taxpayers’ money should another crisis ensue. Despite policy-makers’ best efforts to 
provide all the necessary tools37, for instance the un-tested Basel III and new EBU frameworks, Georg 
Ringe38 argues that this objective is far from complete, stating that: 
In m  opinion he nion in its current agreed-on incarnation is unable to handle major incidents. 
Depositors and short-term creditors enjoy insufficient protection in the event of a collapse, and 
chances are that the stabilization of large banks will, again, be at the expense of EU a pa ers 39. 
 
According to Jeffrey Gordon40, it is not possible to rely on the so-called Single Resolution Fund “SRF” , 
intended to come into play when a bank is in crisis and Basel III requirements, because it will not be 
enough to absorb a shock41.  Instead, Gordon and Ringe argue that banks themselves should have the 
necessary extra capital buffers in place. This way, banks, not taxpayers, carry the burden of 
responsibility42. The SRM currently has capital backstops in place as a last resort precaution, but this is 
essentially taxpayer funded43.  
2.3.2 MAKING SURE THAT BANKS SERVE SOCIETY AND THE REAL ECONOMY 
 
                                                        
31  European Parliament, “Banking Union” , available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_4.2.4.html.  
32 Ibid.  
33  Eurpoean Parliament, “Euro Area Summit Statement” th June 2012) page 2, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.  
34  W Schauble, “How to protect EU taxpayers against bank failures” th August 2012) Financial Times, available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d270a89e-f213-11e1-8973-00144feabdc0.html#axzz43inAaL6r.  
35  F Dierckx, “Deal agreed for Euro bank Fortis” th September 2008) BBC, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7641132.stm - where an .  billion bank bail-out package was agreed. 
36 J Treanor, “RBS sale: Fred Goodwin, the bn bailout and years of losses” rd August 2015) The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/03/rbs-sale-fred-goodwin-bailout-years-of-losses, where a £45 billion bailout 
package was agreed.  
37 European Commission Memo, “Towards a Banking Union” th September 2012), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-12-656_en.htm.  
38 Professor of International Commercial Law with Copenhagen Business School Law Department. 
39 W G Ringe and C S Hansen, “The ecen l  a ed EU banking ni n d e  n  achie e i  bjec i e  (2014) page 2, available at: 
http://www.cbs.dk/en/research/cbs-publications/cbs-research-reporter/news/the-recently-passed-eu-banking-union-does-not-
achieve-its-objective.  
40 Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. 
41 J N Gordon and W G Ringe, “Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would 
Take”  page 2, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361347.   
42 Ibid. See also, Ringe and Hansen (n 38) at 2. 
43 M Grande, speech at the Florence School of Banking & Finance (11th December 2015), available at: http://fbf.eui.eu/starting-up-
the-single-resolution-mechanism/.  
 





A banking system that is resilient, serving society and the economy productively, while not being founded 
on moral hazard, is pivotal44. For example, the EBU’s new bail-in regime should, theoretically, discipline 
the market, consequently reducing moral hazard, whilst improving the standard of risk taking. As a result, 
Benoit Lallemand 45  argues that lending will improve in the real economy, banks will become more 
diversified and financial stability will be strengthened46. In essence this would mean that banks are 
transparent, sustainable and effective, with funds financing the economy47. 
 
Conversely, many banks have a high degree of inter-connectedness due to being part of a bigger mega-
bank structure48. Until these structures are broken down, the bail-in tool may not be workable, as 
supervisors will not want to provoke a domino of bank failures49. Without any sort of structural reform 
on the issue of too-big-to-fail, the EBU could potentially make matters worse by federalising risk and thus 
re-igniting the issue of moral hazard50. Given that “we are still living  in a paradigm where it’s all up to 
the financial markets to decide what is good or not”51, reforms must be made in this area if confidence is 
to be restored.  
 
2.3.3 RESTORING CREDIBILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
The new EBU framework of improved regulation of the financial system, with better supervision and 
resolution mechanisms, can be said to be the starting point for restoring the credibility of the financial 
sector52. The SSM ensures there is constant rigorous and independent supervision while the SRM ensures 
the smooth resolution of banks53. Ultimately, these mechanisms will increase confidence and financial 
stability within Europe and therefore the credibility of the financial sector54. 
 
The author would argue however, that in order to restore credibility in the banking sector, improvements 
have to go beyond better regulation. A change in financial sector culture, which implants appropriate 
behaviours and values, is also required55. According to John Mellor56, “responses from regulators to the 
failure in bank governance and standards of conduct revealed by the Financial Crisis, fall short of what is 
needed to restore credibility and trust in the financial sector”57. What is required is the restoration of 
financial ethics, behaviours and values58.  
 
As highlighted by the Larosiere Report, proper governance establishes strong core values that underpin 
the ethos of a firm59 . This culture comes from the top and is filtered into the organisation, which 
influences decision-making. However, the changing of culture is only a part of the bigger picture, but is 
an important element for the retention of trust60. In a speech by Mark Carney61, he stated that the 
                                                        
44  B Lallemand and F Keegan, “Executive Briefing” , available at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com 
/search?q=cache:p-JzfS9P554J:www.finance-watch.org/ifile/Press%2520coverage/Lafferty%2520Insights%2520OCT14%2520-%252 
0Benoit%2520Lallemand%2520Interview.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk.   
45 Secretary General of Brussels based “Finance Watch”. 
46 Lallemand and Keegan (n 43).    
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.   
51 Ibid.   
52 European Commission Memo (n 36). 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55  J Mellor, “Regulation and Culture Change In Banks” th September 2015) available at: 
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=4462.  
56 Professor of Governance in Banking and Finance at the University of Leicester.  
57 Mellor (n 54).  
58 Ibid.  
59  European Commission, “Internal Market”  page , available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf. 
60 Mellor (n 54). 
61 Governor of the Bank of England.  
 





financial sector still has a long way to go in restoring credibility and trust62. One only has to view past 
events driven by self-interest, to realise how much still has to be done before this objective can be 
achieved63.  
 
2.3.4 BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR BANKS64 
 
The SDC highlighted the “vicious circle” that exists between member states and their banks65. Certain 
EU member states66 were materially exposed as “lender of last resort to their domestic banks, whilst 
those domestic banks, in turn, held considerable amounts of sovereign debt issued by their home EU 
Member State and thereby exposed the creditworthiness of that state”67. To break the bank-sovereign 
nexus, an objective of the EBU is to ensure the cost of bank failure is borne by the private sector, not the 
taxpayer 68 . The introduction of the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
`”BRRD”  is a crucial step towards this69.  
 
As the author currently writes this paper however, it appears that the bank-sovereign “doom-loop is 
rearing its ugly head again”70. Italy is a case in point. Currently, Italy’s debt is just under .  trillion71, or 
about 133% of its annual economic output72. Despite this astronomical debt burden, and achieving the 
status of one of the world’s most indebted nations, last year the Italian government managed to sell two-
year bonds at a negative yield73. Such a situation fails to instill the reasonable man with confidence in the 
financial sector74. It also leads to the important question of whether Italian banks own too much Italian 
government debt75. This situation has proved to be disturbing for the Single Resolution Board “SRB” , 
whose objective is to ensure that Europe’s banks remain on a stable foundation76. Despite the argument 
that Europe does not yet have the resources to handle a full meltdown of such magnitude, Italy is fast 
becoming “the greatest threat to the world’s already burdened financial system”77.  
 
It is clear that robust change is needed78. The German government and SRB have called for a ‘ceiling’ to 
be placed on banks’ holding of sovereign debt. The SDC, and now Italy, has shown that the lethal 
connection between weak banks and risky sovereigns is a recipe for disaster79. If the link between the 
bank-sovereign were not severed, then rather than averting a future debt crisis, it would encourage it.  
 
                                                        
62 Mellor (n 54). 
63 For example the ENRON and LIBOR scandals, the multiple insider dealing cases, and RBS’s “Fred the Shred” and his constant 
desire for “more”.  
64 See “Figure ” below. See also, European Parliament n  at 1.  
65 See “Figure ” below. 
66 For example, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal to name but a few.  
67 D Singh and J Hodges, “Turning The Tide? How European Banking and Financial Services Legislation are Making Waves on the 
Enforcement Front” in R P Buckley, E Avgouleas and D W Arner, Reconceptualising Global Finance and its Regulation (2016) 308 
at 310.   
68  Deloitte, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Banking on the Banking Union”  page , available at: 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/fr/Documents/services-financiers/publications/deloitte_etude_Banking-on-
the-banking-union_oct2014.pdf.  
69 Ibid.  
70  A Evans-Pritchard, “Europe’s ‘doom-loop’ returns as credit markets seize up” th February 2016), available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12149114/Europes-doom-loop-returns-as-credit-markets-seize-up.html.  
71 See National Debt Clocks, available at: http://www.nationaldebtclocks.org/debtclock/italy - for an up to date report.  
72 T Barber, “The doom-loop that ties Italian banks” th March 2016), available at: http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2016/03/the-
doom-loop-that-ties-italian-banks/.  
73 Ibid.  
74 This is because Italian banks held about  billion in domestic government securities in January 2016. These securities 
account for roughly .  of the banks’ assets, which is a much higher proportion than any other major EU economy.  
75 Barber (n 71).  
76 Ibid.  
77  J Moore, “Will Italian banks spark another financial crisis?” 7th March 2016), available at: 
http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/03/will-italian-banks-spark-another-financial-crisis/.  
78 Barber (n 71).  
79 Ibid.  
 










3.0 THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 
 
3.1 SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM 
 
During the financial crises, due to EU member states applying inconsistent standards when evaluating 
banks, the Euro area became particularly affected. The rationale for a SSM, which is a supra-national 
prudential supervisory body, ensuring that the same rules apply to all “credit institutions” 81  and to 
permanently monitor performance82 was created to make the Euro area more financially stable83 and 
prevent “regulatory arbitrage”84.  
 
As one of the main pillars, the SSM is both a supervisory mechanism and legal framework embedded in 
a functioning EBU architecture85. The legal structure consists of the SSM Framework Regulation86 and 
the SSM Regulation87. Having regard to the proportionality principle88, under the SSM the ECB, as the 
ultimate supervisor 89 , has legal and prudential authority 90  to carry out key supervisory duties 91  for 
participating member states 92  in the EBU, with other supervisory tasks being assigned to national 
competent authorities “NCAs” 93.  
 
                                                        
80  P Coy, “A way to break out of Europe’s ‘Doom Loop’ th June 2012), available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-26/a-way-to-break-out-of-europes-doom-loop.  
81 Articles 1, 2 (3), 4 (1) and 14 (1) Council Regulation / . Hereafter the words “credit institutions” and “banks” will be used 
interchangeably  both referring to the same issue.  
82  European Central Bank, Banking Supervision, “Single Supervisory Mechanism” , available at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html.  
83  C Roux, “Working with the Single Supervisory Mechanism regime” th November 2015), available at: 
http://www.bis.org/review/r151204e.htm.  
84 Article 1, Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
85 Roux (n 82).  
86 Regulation 468/2014.  
87 Council Regulation 1024/2013. See also, M Magnus, J Backman and C Power, “Banking Union” September , available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_4.2.4.html; Roux (n 82). 
88 Article 1 Council Regulation 1024/2013. See also, Practical Law, “Single supervisory mechanism SSM ” th March 2016), 
available at: http://uk.practicallaw.com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/5-536-2625#.  
89 As defined in the Capital Requirements Regulation 575/2013. See also, Practical Law (n 87). 
90 Article 1 Council Regulation 1024/2013. See also, Recital 1 Regulation 468/2014.  
91 Articles 1 and 4 Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
92 “Participating member state” refers to Eurozone member states and non-Eurozone member states that have established 
“close co-operation”, see Article   Council Regulation / . See also, Practical Law (n 87). It is also worth noting that the 
UK, for example, is a non-participant in the SSM and therefore credit institutions established in the UK are not subject to 
supervision by the ECB, see Practical Law, “European banking union: overview” th March 2016), available at: 
http://uk.practicallaw.com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/6-521-6054#a325494. See also, CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU.  
93 Recital 1 Regulation 468/2014. See also, Practical Law (n 87). See also, Roux (n 82). 
 





The SSM ensures that banks comply with EBU rules and assesses whether banks are fit to operate94. The 
main objectives of the SSM are to:  
1. Increase financial stability and integration; 
2. Ensure that supervision is consistent; and 
3. Ensure that the EU banking system is safe, healthy and resilient to outside shocks, like financial 
crises95. 
 
3.1.1 DIVISION OF LABOUR 
 
Labour has been divided between the ECB and NCAs. For example, the ECB supervises banks deemed 
“significant”96 while NCAs supervise “less significant”97 credit institutions98. However, supervision does 
not cover the shadow-banking sector99. The criteria that determine whether banks are significant, and 
therefore falling under ECB supervision, relate to the banks’ economic significance, their size, cross 
border activities100 and need for Eurozone support101. Essentially the most systemically important banks 
are supervised by the ECB with less important banks being supervised by NCAs102. The ECB however, has 
the overarching authority for every credit institution within the EBU framework103 but several member 
states104 have stated that the SSM should be restricted to systemically important institutions only. Given 
that local regional banks105 are not systemically important because they are classed as low risk, it may be 
argued that supervising over 6,000 European banks is too onerous a task for the SSM106.   
 
3.1.2 SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
The ECB has far reaching powers and can conduct on-site inspections107 and launch investigations108; 
grant, revoke, limit or sanction109 the business110; conduct assessments111; monitor compliance112; and 
determine capital requirements113. ECB Regulation, accompanied by the CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU 
provides “exclusive competence” on the ECB when a bank breaches, or risks breaching, its regulatory 
capital requirements and remedial action is needed114. The ECB’s supervisory responsibilities depend on 
whether a credit institution is deemed ‘significant’ or not. Although for all credit institutions participating 
in the SSM, supervisory responsibilities include115: 
1. Licensing and authorising credit institutions116; 
                                                        
94 Article 1 Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
95 European Central Bank (n 81).  
96 Article 6 (4) Council Regulation 1024/2013. Currently the ECB supervises 129 banks accounting for 82% of bank assets. See 
European Central Bank (n 81). 
97 Article 6 (4) Council Regulation 1024/2013. See also, European Central Bank (n 81).  
98 Recital 5 Regulation 468/2014.   
99 For example, the insurance sector, investment firms, hedge funds etc.  
100 Article 59 Regulation 468/2014, suggests that a credit institution will be significant if the ratio of cross-border assets/liabilities 
to its total assets/liabilities is above 20%. 
101 Article 6 (4) Council Regulation 1024/2013.  
102 Magnus et al (n 86).   
103 Article 6 Council Regulation 1024/2013.   
104  Germany, Austria and Italy; see N Veron, “Europe’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: most small banks are German and 
Austrian and Italian ” nd September 2014), available at: http://bruegel.org/2014/09/europes-single-supervisory-mechanism-
most-small-banks-are-german-and-austrian-and-italian/.  
105 Whereas banks that are out-with these countries are usually part of a bigger conglomerate. See Veron (n 103).  
106 Veron (n 103).   
107 Recital 47 and Article 12 Council Regulation 1024/2013.   
108 Recital 47 Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
109 Articles 18 and 120-137 Council Regulation 1024/2013. See also Council Regulation 2532/98, Amending Council Regulation 
2015/159 and ECB Regulation 2157/99. 
110 Article 16 (2) (e) Council Regulation 1024/2013.   
111 Recital 37 and Article 6 (4) Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
112 Recital 9 and Article 4 (1) (d) (e) Council Regulation 1024/2013. 
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2. Assessing the qualifying holdings of credit institutions117. 
 
For significant credit institutions, the supervisory responsibilities of the ECB include118: 
1. Assessment of passport applications119; 
2. Impose credit institutions with various prudential requirements120; 
3. Impose governance requirements on credit institutions, for example, leverage, liquidity and 
capital requirements121; 
4. Carry out stress tests and supervisory reviews122; 
5. Participate in supervising a financial conglomerate123; and 
6. Supervisory tasks are carried out in relation to recovery plans124. 
 
Despite these detailed supervisory responsibilities, Andreas Dombret125 has highlighted a weakness in 
the SSM structure. Dombret argues that supervisors are able to use their discretion when interpreting 
prudential national rules due to various available options under the law126. It is submitted that such a 
situation creates an un-level playing field, especially when a key objective of the SSM is consistent 
supervision. 
 
3.1.3 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
To prevent conflicts of interest, the legislation provides clear rules that identify the operational and 
organisational separation of power in the area of monetary policy and supervision 127. According to 
Professor Avgouleas, supervision is a politically charged issue and given that the ECB is impartial and 
independent, this may be compromised. Therefore, it is crucial that this supervisory function is distinct 
from the ECB in order to preserve its autonomy. However, conflicts of interest are still deemed a concern. 
Bundesbank Deputy President Claudia Buch recently raised concerns calling “for a clearer line to be 
drawn between SSM activities and monetary policy, since both sets of tasks are housed at the ECB, with 
the ECB Governing Council as the supreme decision-making body. This set-up is a potential source of 
conflicts of interest, which only an amendment of the EU Treaties could resolve” 128. This opinion is in line 
with that of Professor Isabel Schnabel129, who believes that conflicting interests are a noticeable issue 
because housing the SSM at the ECB has not only created an institution that is too powerful, but also an 
institution that may be open to abuse130. 
 
3.1.4 JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM 
 
Supervision of a credit institution that is deemed ‘significant’, lies with the so-called ‘joint supervisory 
team’ “JST” , which is an international team housed in Frankfurt131. The JST comprises staff of the 
                                                        
117 Recital 2 CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU.  
118 Practical Law (n 87).  
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128 C Buch, Deputy President of Bundesbank, “Challenges Lie Ahead for the Single Supervisory Mechanism” th February 2016), 
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national supervisors and ECB 132  and effective functioning is based on their co-operation with each 
other133. Having such a multi-talented and skilled team would undoubtedly be regarded as one of the 
JST’s strengths. Yet having such a diverse set of individuals can also be problematic. Cyril Roux argues 
that:  
The f nc ioning of he JST s faces he combined managemen  challenges of international public 
institutions, matrix structures and the tensions brought by the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities. Familiar in other contexts, these management challenges are specific to the 
conduct of supervision at a new supra-national level. Delivering consistent, timely and effective 
supervision, including the issuance and follow up of remediation programs, is proving challenging 
for issues that go beyond capital requirements. So too is keeping staff motivated through the 
complex network of na ional a hori ies and he ECB 134.  
 
3.1.5 THE SUPERVISORY BOARD 
 
The Supervisory Board “SB”  and Governing Council “GC”  control the SSM135. The SB is the prominent 
body of the ECB where debates take place on supervisory issues. Essentially, proposals are brought to 
the SB by the JST, with a view to making them a reality. The GC can either adopt or object the decisions136.  
 
The SB and GC are composed of senior, skilled and experienced professionals, bringing both challenges 
and strengths to its function. The combined knowledge of personnel has been classed as “formidable” 
where decisions are challenged, debated and approached with the rigour necessary to provide a 
thorough analysis 137 . Yet there is an argument that the SB and GC do not have enough first hand 
experience in banking specific matters, making the process laboured and cumbersome at times138. It has 
also been argued that reducing the personnel and bringing in a new skill set that relates specifically to 
the banking sector would be far more effective139.   
 
Furthermore, as every decision relating to prudential supervision goes through the SB and subsequently 
the GC because of EU legislative requirements; Cyril Roux argues that due to the centralised and 
blinkered decision making procedure, the whole process is no longer efficient: 
No  a single decision, e en he mos  ro ine and leas  conseq en ial one, has been delega ed. 
Electronic mailboxes of Supervisory Board members and Governors are clogged with a daily 
shower of insignificant written procedures, and unproblematic fitness and probity applications can 
take months to be processed. Legal impediments need to be lifted to make delegation possible 




It is the ECB’s view that enforcement is a fundamental component of supervision. As yet, the SSM has 
not managed nor concluded a case by utilising their enforceability mechanism effectively 141 . It is 
submitted, that to supervise such a self-interested and insular industry effectively, and given that the 
SSM has “yet to find its feet as an enforcer”, it is imperative that prudential regulation is an enforceable 
mechanism142. Despite the EBU being a “major step” towards enhancing the monitoring of risk and the 
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efficient management of distress within the financial sector, it is submitted that further reforms and 
challenges lie ahead for the SSM143.  
 
3.2 SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
 
The SRM144 is the second pillar of the EBU and compliments the SSM. The SRM ensures the smooth 
resolution of banks. When a bank is failing or likely to fail, a new framework exists to resolve the problems 
and the Single Resolution Board “SRB” 145 is the authority within the SRM to handle the resolution of 
those banks146.  
 
Eurozone and EU member states participating in the EBU have signed an inter-governmental agreement 
on transferring finances and sharing them in a common SRF147 designed to help ailing banks148. The fund 
is part of the SRM, which consists of the SRB, whose key objective is to plan and decide how to wind 
down or restructure banks that are no longer viable within the harmonised framework149. The SRM 
Regulation “SRMR” 150  is correlated with the BRRD 151 , setting out a new recovery and resolution 
framework for credit institutions152 within the EU153.  
 
3.2.1 RATIONALE FOR THE SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
 
According to the initial legislative proposal for the SRMR, the European Commission “EC”  did not feel 
it was wise to leave the resolution of banks to the SSM, but instead have a separate SRM pillar, dealing 
exclusively with recovery and resolution with the help of National Resolution Authorities “NRAs”  in 
participating member states154. Once established the EC’s view was that the SRM would detach risk 
arising from market skepticism; a lack of centralised system to deal with distressed banks; and the 
tensions arising between the ECB (as the SSM head body) and NRAs155. Moreover, apart from helping to 
avert any looming crises, the mechanism is expected to boost economic growth, due to confidence that 
Europe’s banks are all using the same rulebook, thus stabilising expectations of investors, consumers 
and depositors in the marketplace156.  
 
3.2.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
 
According to the EC, there are four key objectives of the SRM, namely: 
1. Break the vicious ‘doom loop’157 circle between sovereigns and banks; 
                                                        
143 Buch (n 127).  
144 The SRM was established by Regulation 806/2014 and has applied in full from the 1st January 2016, see Article 99 (2) Regulation 
806/2014. Although there are exceptions that apply in that certain issues came into force prior to this date. These will be dealt 
with when they arise in the body of the text.  
145 Article 42 (1) Regulation 806/2014 established the SRB. See also, Articles 42 (2) and 48 Regulation 806/2014, which gives the 
SRB its own legal personality and is based in Brussels. 
146 Grande (n 42).  
147 This inter-governmental agreement was signed in Brussels on the 21st May 2014, European Commission, “Member states sign 
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Structure and Financing”, (15th September 2014) page 11, available at: 
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152 Capital Requirements Regulation 575/2013. 
153 Practical Law (n 147). 
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2. Sidestep the risk of contagion and bank runs; 
3. Remove internal market fragmentation; and 
4. Reinforce confidence in the banking industry158. 
 
The SRM is also aimed at protecting public funds, taxpayers, and the economy as a whole, from the 
excessive costs from bank failures by applying and implementing effective and swift resolution 
procedures159.  
 
3.2.3 SINGLE RESOLUTION BOARD 
 
The Single Resol ion Board has been crea ed o respond o he E ro area crisis  B  a oiding 
bail-outs and worst-case scenarios, the SRB will put the banking sector on a sounder footing  
onl  hen can e achie e economic gro h and financial s abili 160. 
 
The SRB, as the central decision maker,161consists of a full-time chair162, four full-time members163 and a 
member appointed from each participating member state164. They are responsible for the functioning of 
the SRM in terms of adopting consistent and relevant plans in terms of ‘significant’, ‘less significant’ and 
cross border banks165. Moreover, due to the “potentially systemic nature of all financial  institutions”, 
the SRB and NCA work in co-operation with one another166. The ECB, as supervisor, has a Memorandum 
of Understanding “MoU”  with the SRB regarding information exchange and co-operation167, and will 
alert the SRB if a bank is in trouble or likely to fail. As well as the ECB, the SRB is accountable to the EC, 
the Council of the EU “COEU”  and the European Parliament “EP”  168, who have the power to object 
to proposed resolution procedures169. Having many policy actors can be viewed positively because of 
constant checks and balances but the down side is the potential for a multi-layered and bureaucratic 
political process resulting in an ineffective and overly complex system.  
 
3.2.4 DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
 
The decision making process is split between executive and plenary sessions170 and there is a distinction 
between the two171.  
 
1. Plenary Sessions: 
                                                        
158  European Council, “Single resolution Mechanism” th March 2016), available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-resolution-mechanism/.  
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The SRB considers general issues correlated with the functioning of the SRM172. A plenary session 
consists of all members of the SRB173, EC and ECB representatives174. The voting procedure is a simple 
majority with the Chair having the deciding vote in the event of a tie175. Any resolution decisions 
involving the SRF over billion, will be decided in this session, while anything under this amount 
allows the SRB to make individual decisions176. 
 
2. Executive Sessions:     
An executive session is for the resolution, or potential resolution, of individual ailing banks.  During 
this session, the SRB consists of the Chair and full-time SRB members177, along with the participating 
member state representative, the EC, ECB178 and members representing member states in which 
there are bank subsidiaries179. Like the plenary session, the voting procedure is by simple majority 
with the Chair casting the deciding vote if there is a tie180.  
 
Lucia Quaglia181 has stated that due to the many policy actors that are involved182, the decision making 
process is extremely convoluted and there is a severe lack of clarity when it comes to understanding the 
overarching procedures183. Furthermore, the SRB is accountable to the EC, EP and COEU for any decisions 
that it makes184. The SRB is also required to submit annual reports185 and to reply in writing to national 
parliaments, should they so request186. This arguably adds further layers of confusion, underpinned by 
political agendas and interferences. The voting procedure has also raised concerns because it has been 
argued that a simple majority does not go far enough and may allow larger banks to exert their 
authority187. Given that member states would not have a veto if they were against any decisions, it may 
potentially lead to problems188.  
 
3.2.5 PHASE-IN PROCESS 
 
Starting in 2015, the SRB has been responsible for collecting information in co-operation with NRA’s for 
resolution planning activities 189 . The resolution planning is the preparation for an actual resolution 
case190. For each bank under the SRB’s remit, an ex ante approach is adopted on how the crisis would be 
managed when/if it comes 191 . This preparatory phase also allows banks to have adequate internal 
resources to be able to finance whatever resolution strategy is most appropriate; this is the so-called 
minimum requirement and eligible liabilities element192. There will always be an element of risk attached 
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to working on an ex ante premise as predicting future events can never be completely accurate193yet the 
nature of commerce is about future projections and these can only be calculated based on past events.194.  
 
As of 1st January 2016, the SRB became fully operational. Mauro Grande195 stated the SRB “stands ready”, 
but was also quick to point out that the main challenge is that the resolution framework in Europe is 
completely new. The “paradigm shift from bail-out to bail-in” is a new concept and it appears the SRB is 
learning and adapting as it goes along196. This fledgling approach instils little confidence in respect of 
averting another crisis.  
 
3.2.6 SINGLE RESOLUTION FUND 
 
Once the bail-in process and regular financing options have been exhausted, the SRB could draw on the 
SRF197, which will eventually total  billion and is financed by the banking sector198 over an eight year 
period199. This will help limit costs to average European citizens and the real economy, which means that 
taxpayers no longer bail out failing banks, due to the eradication of national resolution funds, but are 
instead bailed in by investors200.  
 
The purpose of the SRF is to ensure that the appropriate funding is available for a failing bank, but is not 
a bailout fund 201 . According to Article 76 of Regulation 806/2014, the SRB can utilise the SRF to 
compensate shareholders and creditors; to contribute to a bridge financing structure; purchase assets; 
make loans to the failing institution; to guarantee the assets or liabilities of the failing institution; and to 
contribute to failing institution202. 
 
However, given that “the cost of bank failures should be borne by the financial industry and not by 
taxpayers”203, it is interesting to discover that the bridge financing structure comes from the national 
government if/when the SRF runs out of capital. Furthermore, in a recent speech, Mauro Grande stated 
that where the SRF does not have enough capital to finance a resolution case, then a financial backstop 
would be implemented, which is essentially a public bailout204 - how the bank-sovereign nexus is to 
broken therefore, remains a mystery. This brings an argument by Claus Rosenkratz Hansen205 into sharp 
focus, where he strongly argues that  billion will be nowhere near enough money to stabilise a 
systemically important bank206. One has to wonder if indeed “there has been a paradigm shift from bail-
out to bail-in”207, but also, given the inter-connectedness of banks and the potential risk of contagion, 
when one bank fails others undoubtedly follow.  
 
These mechanisms are supposed to be in place to avert another crisis, yet it may actually contribute. A 
potential solution could be to break the bank structure down into smaller more manageable businesses, 
which would be easier to handle in the event of another crisis.   
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4.0 EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME208 
 
Although not yet in force, the EC, in November 2015, put forward a proposal to implement the third pillar 
of the EBU with a EDIS. This is “a further step to a fully fledged Banking Union… which would provide a 
stronger and more uniform degree of insurance cover for all retail depositors” within the EBU209.  
 
In its simplest form, the proposal by Lord Commissioner Hill intends to move the current system of 
national deposit guarantee schemes “NDGS”  to EDIS, which essentially underwrites deposits across 
the EBU210. EDIS applies to deposits below ,  of all EU banks. The purpose of EDIS ensures the 
equal protection of deposits within the EBU, regardless of which participating member state the funds 
were deposited211. A harmonised scheme ensures that banks would be better protected in the event of 
larger local shocks by thus relying on the central fund212. EDIS has several safeguards in place against 
moral hazard and abuse, which incentivise NDGS to manage risk prudently until EDIS takes over213.  
 
EDIS will be cost neutral for the banking sector, which means that the contributions that were already 
being paid to NDGS will be switched to EDIS214. Riskier banks will pay higher contributions than safer 
banks so the process is risk weighted, which will be strengthened as EDIS is implemented215. There is also 
the crucial issue of the bank-sovereign nexus, where measures will be implemented to ensure that banks 
are adequately diversified216.  
 
It is proposed to commence EDIS in 2017 based over a three-stage process.  
1. The first stage involves the re-insurance of NDGS, which will last three years. In this stage the idea 
is that the NDGS is able to access EDIS funds, up to a certain amount, when all other options are 
exhausted. This first stage is said to weaken the bank-sovereign nexus, but does not go far 
enough to provide equal levels of protection for depositors217.  
2. The second stage, starting in 2020, will see EDIS becoming gradually mutualised, but still subject 
to specific safeguards and limits with regard to abuse. The difference with this stage is that NDGS 
would not be required to exhaust its own funds before accessing EDIS funds. Thus introducing a 
higher risk between EDIS and NDGS218.    
3. The final stage is a fully-fledged EDIS by 2024. This is done by gradually increasing the share of 
risk so that EDIS assumes 100%219.  
 
Although not yet in force, and despite arguments to the contrary220, commentators, particularly German, 
have been highly critical of EDIS, especially Ludger Schuknecht221 who states that: 
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There are no convincing answers to a number of important questions, such as this: Is this new 
European insurance product even necessary? How would incentives for governments, markets and 
banks change? Would more solidarity in this respect really lead to more stability in Europe? Is the 
proposal compatible with the foundations of the market economy and the subsidiarity principle 
in E rope? And ha  o ld i  mean for he economic and poli ical f re in E rope? 222. 
 
Angela Merkel has also been vocal as to why German depositors should be liable to help bail-out failing 
banks elsewhere within the EU as, she states, risk should first be minimised before proposals are tabled 
regarding shared responsibility223. “It is not hard to see why domestic politicians from the stronger 
economies would be extremely reluctant to assume open-ended responsibility for other countries’ 
financial woes, as manifested in the state of their banks, given lines of responsibility and accountability 
to domestic populations”224. Given that EDIS is still being negotiated, it may be prudent to leave this part 




That there are weak points of the emerging architecture of EBU is indisputable225. ‘Political will’, or the 
lack of it, in the form of national interests taking precedence over wider geographical concerns remains 
an obstacle to a more stable banking union. The legalities of what is permissible under EU law, in terms 
of strengthening the EBU structure without amendment to the Treaty, are also problematic226. These 
issues in particular have a knock on effect which spiral downwards, creating a multi-layered bureaucracy 
which is not always helpful when speedy decisions are called for. It is imperative, that with the speed of 
societal changes in modern times, the mechanisms that uphold the EBU have the flexibility to move at a 
rate to meet those needs. There are additional weaknesses in the structure. Reform is required on the 
“too big to fail” issue. Banks and financial institutions need to provide further capital backstops to absorb 
shock. A more uniform approach is required when interpreting prudential national rules. The argument 
also exists regarding housing the SSM at the ECB in that, that institution may be too powerful and open 
to abuse. The JST now faces the pressure of management challenges on a new supra-nationalist level. It 
is debatable whether the SB and GC have the right skill sets for the job. Are bail-in procedures really going 
to obviate the need for bail-outs? All these, and many more, controversial issues require to be debated 
extensively, and decisions made that strengthen the overall structure.  
 
Whether in favour of its creation or not, given its handicaps, the EBU has done remarkably well. It has 
not had the luxury of remaining in an embryonic state for any length of time and, regardless of its tender 
years, has been forced to hit the ground running. What it has achieved in that time, in the form of 
improved regulation, supervision and resolution mechanisms, is significant.  
 
Its main pillars in the form of the SSM and SRM (and proposed EDIS) are sturdy foundations on which to 
build a strong and shock proof structure. Of course the real proof of whether any piece of architecture 
can weather the storm is only ever evidenced after the event but that does not mean that every 
possibility to prevent damage is not considered ahead of time and every calculation done to mitigate 
loss.   
 
The cost in human suffering can never be accurately weighed against monetary loss, but the two are 
indisputably linked in the effects of the GFC and SDC. People lost their jobs, their life savings, their homes 
and consequently many families broke up. For future disasters of a similar nature to be avoided, it is 
imperative that the players in the negotiation processes, responsible for building upon the structure of 
                                                        
222  L Schuknecht, “An insurance scheme that only ensure problems” th February 2016), available at: 
http://blogs.faz.net/fazit/2016/02/08/an-insurance-scheme-that-only-ensures-problems-7298/.  
223 J Strupczewski, “’EU deposit insurance’ vanishes from EU leaders’ draft conclusions” th December 2015), available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eurozone-banks-deposits-idUKKBN0U11KP20151218. See also, Buch (n 127). 
224 Ferran (n 1) at 25.  
225 Ferran (n 1) at 26.   
226 Ferran (n 1) at 25. 
 





the EBU, put self-interest aside. If these players are capable of this, and additionally have the will as well 
as the ability to address the many diverse problems that weaken the structure, then the writer submits, 
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